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This paper investigates reasons for the uneasy relationship between Systemic 
Functional Linguistics (SFL) and the discipline of psychology. It proposes a role 
for psychological data in SFL, and describes a case study that attempts to 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
A criticism that is sometimes levelled against Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) by 
other fields of linguistics is its apparent lack of interest in a psychological perspective or 
desire to develop an underlying psycholinguistic basis to its theories of discourse. While 
other functional linguistic theories, such as Functional Grammar (FG) and Role and 
Reference Grammar (RRG), are committed to exploiting psycholinguistic research, this 
rarely applies to SFL (Butler, 2003; 2008). Notable exceptions that are SFL-inspired 
often make explicit the lack of psychological theory, or purposefully incorporate 
psycholinguistic theories (e.g. Clark and Chafe for Lassen, 2003, and Grosz and Sidner’s 
Centering theoy for Emmott, 1997). Emmott (1997) notes that SFL takes up an 
ideological position by leaving its psychological theory of language implicit, particularly 
in contrast to mainstream linguistic theories which depend heavily on theories of 
psychology, especially those inspired by Chomsky’s view of linguistics as a sub-field of 
psychology.  
 
                                                           
1 My heartfelt thanks go to David Vernon, whose kindness, wisdom and patience sparked 
my interest in these issues, and whose valuable feedback greatly improved an earlier draft, to 
Eileen O’Brien for help and encouragement, and to Geoff Thompson and Michael Hoey 
for guidance and inspiration. None of these people, however, should be held responsible for 
any errors or omissions in this paper. 
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This criticism of SFL will be addressed later in this paper. However, before SFL and 
psychology can converge a number of changes need to be made. The first need for 
change is for the discipline and sub-disciplines of psychology in general, including many 
branches of psycholinguistics, to examine a range of questionable premises. An 
adequate functional theory of language should not be based on psychology until it can 
trace its theories back to biological descriptions. The developments in neurobiology 
that demand change in psychological descriptions of language will be reviewed in the 
following section, before looking at the implications for SFL. 
2 THE NEED FOR CHANGE IN PSYCHOLOGY 
There is little that can be said of psychology’s support for the ideological status quo 
that cannot be said about other social sciences. In my view what distinguishes 
psychology as a discipline is that it has been more resistant to reflexivity in its methods 
and beliefs; it has been less willing to examine its philosophical basis in a positivist 
philosophy than most other disciplines, including those in the “hard” sciences. This has 
resulted in practices and theories that pay no attention to their ideological basis, and 
therefore could easily result in theories that are dependent on the current socio-
economic historical moment: 
In addition to the challenges about its ‘empiricism, objectivism, behaviourism, 
operationalism, reductionism, materialism, mechanism, universalism’ (Gabreyna, 
1998, p.50), as well as its ethnocentrism, racism, scientism, and sexism, 
psychology has recently come in for criticism regarding its individuocentrism. 
(Holdstock, 2000, p.88) 
Without considering the possibility that the search for individual differences, for 
instance, is a result of modern consumer-driven capitalism and neo-liberal politics, 
psychological studies that take the individual as an unexamined concept cannot claim 
universality – the ultimate aim of psychology. 
 
In establishing itself as an academic discipline, mainstream psychology has adopted a 
positivist deterministic paradigm, fundamentally relying on a Cartesian split between 
mind and body. With this split, psychology is free to study the mind as a separate entity 
to biology, sociology and language. A representationist view of language is a natural 
response to this condition (Thibault, 1999). Thus, most linguists who have adopted a 
contemporary psychological perspective (pre- or post-behaviourist, or cognitive) have 
been limited by the representationist paradigm. This partly explains the apparently 
impoverished view of language taken by many linguists when seen from an SFL 
perspective. As opposed to the multi-functional nature of language in an SFL paradigm, 
many linguists restrict themselves to ideational features of syntax, proposing that other 
features of language belong to non-grammatical domains such as pragmatics because 
they cannot be explained by the presumed logic-based structures (Thibault, 1999). It 
must be remembered, however, that logic is an abstraction of one aspect of natural 
language – the ideational – and so any description derived from logic will be inadequate 
to represent all language.  
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Representationist theories of language have been well served by the discipline of 
psychology, while linguistic theories that adopt a phenomenological paradigm have 
been left waiting for an adequate psychological explanation for language. It is therefore 
easy for a linguistic theory based on an inadequate theory of the mind – one that 
assumes that language is based on representation within a logic-based tradition – to 
claim ‘anti-mentalism’ for theories that are waiting for psychology to catch up with a 
general theory of relativity in physics, autopoiesis in biology, systems theory in 
sociology and systemic functionalism in linguistics. With the central concept of 
ideational aspects of language acting to construe reality within a social context, SFL has 
long positioned itself in the phenomenological tradition. 
 
The developments in all natural sciences that are promoting a new perspective, 
threatening a paradigm shift, include quantam theory in physics, complexity in social 
science, and autopoiesis in biology. They all have at least two things in common: 
 
1. they deal with interactions, relations and dynamic systems rather than 
descriptions and states. 
2. they are relativistic, in that they see their observer’s role as one part of the 
dynamic – the observer is always a part of the observation. That is, 
philosophically they are aligned to a phenomenological perspective. 
 
That is, these developments are more philosophically aligned to SFL than the previous 
models of science based on the logical positivism that is still the underlying model of 
most modern psychology. A phenomenological psychology does not yet seem to have 
materialised.  
 
Phenomenology is proposed as a solution to the Realism-Idealism impasse. Realists 
hold that the outside world is all that matters. We perceive reality. Realism says there is 
a reality out there – all we have to do is try to understand it. In this approach the mind 
becomes the only reality that we can be sure of. This approach is highly influential in 
modern society. The idea that a scientist or journalist can possibly be “objective” 
derives from the assumption that they detach themselves from the situation and 
comment dispassionately on the situation. In contrast, Idealists claim that reality is 
defined by our perception of it. We can perceive objects into existence through 
empirical methods. It claims that all of reality is contingent on our understanding. 
Therefore, some will argue that there is no objective truth – that there is only your truth 
and my truth and they are equally valid. 
 
Both extremes present problems. In an idealist doctrine, there can be no mutually-
agreed reality. This does not match up to our experience, because we can easily share 
perceptions that appear to match in all conceivable ways. In a realist doctrine, the mind 
aims to represent external reality. It is thus separate from reality, and so we must 
account for the mechanisms and processes used for representation. This has yet to be 
accomplished.  
 
Many linguists automatically speak the Realist language of representation because they 
are entrenched in the consequent brain-as-computer metaphor, with syntax as the 
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“operating system” and words as data. To provide just one example, on rejecting 
Mithen’s (2005) thesis that phylogenetically it was the “Singing Neanderthal” that laid 
the evolutionary foundations for language, Tallerman (2006) seems unable to use any 
other metaphor to describe the functioning of the linguistic brain:  
Problem number one: each utterance also has to be stored as a single concept in 
the hominin’s mental lexicon, and retrieved from storage to be uttered. (p.106)  
It is Realism that has dominated scientific thought through the industrial and post-
industrial eras. Classical physics and biology model an external reality and explain 
universals that exist “out there”. What is still missing in this framework, however, is a 
model of the nature, structure, organisation and processes of the mind-as-computer in 
relation to the body, including the physical brain. Dualism has separated a metaphysical 
mind from the physical brain – a mystery that has been perpetuated rather than solved 
by modernist cognitivism. 
 
Phenomonelogy is attributed to Edmund Husserl who developed Kant’s division 
between noumena and phenomena. Noumena can be glossed as the ‘essence’ of an object, 
while phenomena are that part of the object visible to the observer. Consequently, the 
position of the observer must be taken into account when any observation takes place: 
We play a rôle in defining reality, but only insofar as it affects us as individuals 
(the idealist aspect), that is, insofar as it affects our experience of reality; the 
reality that we perceive does exist (the realist aspect) but our perception and 
conception of it is conditioned by our experience… As perceivers, our 
perceptions of the world are a function of what we are: reality is conditioned by 
experience and experience is conditioned by the nature of the system and its 
history of interaction with reality. (Vernon and Furlong, 2007, p.55) 
I would add that as our experience is meaningfully construed through the linguistic 
system (Halliday and Matthiessen, 1999) it will always be dependent on the personal 
experience of our culture and linguistic system. While we may be able to have 
experiences without language, we will not be able to make sense of them without it; 
‘languaging’ is an integral part of our being and doing.  
 
The practical outcome of an interest in phenomenology in the natural sciences is that of 
enactive systems. Maturana and Varela (1992) use the phenomenological concept of 
autopoiesis as the cornerstone of their biological theory of cognition, which allows the 
environment to take up a significant role in the development of an individual. The 
crucial role of the observer is stated thus: “Behavior is not something that the living 
being does in itself (for in it there are only structural changes) but something we point 
to.” (Maturana and Varela, 1992, p.138) We can only see the effects of structural 
changes. When someone withdraws their hand from a source of heat, the heat is only a 
trigger. The behaviour is the observable result of the system seeking to maintain 
structural balance within itself and with the environment, including other organisms, 
but we cannot observe the structural change itself. This is described diagrammatically 
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(Fig. 1) as an autopoietic organism (one that is genetically re-constituting) maintaining 
autonomy in response to a perturbation in the environment. 
Fig. 1  Interaction of an individual and the environment (from Maturana and Varela, 1992) 
 
What distinguishes ‘lower’ (e.g. single-celled organisms) from higher forms of life is the 
nervous system and so the possibilities for interaction are greatly increased as the 
picture is made more complex with the addition of an internal central nervous system 
and other individuals (Fig. 2). 
Fig. 2 Interaction of an individual with a central nervous system, the environment and another 
individual (from Maturana and Varela, 1992) 
 
 
 
Maturana and Varela (1992) describe language (specifically, the process of languaging) as 
linguistic trophallaxis – it is through language that social interaction and roles are enacted. 
Trophallaxis is the archetypal process of social interaction whereby social roles (the 
ontogeny of an individual) are specified and communicated by chemical transfer. For 
example, in an ant colony a chemical that is passed from one ant to another changes the 
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structure of the receiving organism, and to maintain balance its behaviour is 
immediately modified, which benefits the colony as a whole. Many animal species use 
visual and auditory exchange to achieve ontogeny. Humans probably use language more 
than any other system to assign and maintain social roles. Most importantly in terms of 
phenomenological philosophy, the structure of an organism does not require a mind 
that is separate from a body or from behaviour to enact its social role. Structural 
closure (maintaining balance) and recursion in the central nervous system (exemplified 
by Arbib’s (2000a, 2000b) mirror neurons and Edelman’s (1999) re-entry) result in 
reflection and, ultimately, a form of consciousness. Consciousness for Maturana and 
Varela (1992) is achieved through re-entrant languaging. This means that there is no 
separate module that first ‘thinks’ and then requires language to transmit that thought 
to the outside world. Meaningful thought is only achieved through language (Thibault, 
1999), and communication is a consequence of the process of languaging.  
 
It is important to remember that this is most definitely not a traditional model of 
information transfer. For Maturana and Varela the model of  
Signal – Encoding – Transmitter – Medium – Receiver – Decoding – Signal 
is “basically false”. A signal, or perturbation, created by one organism does not cause a 
change in another. A perturbation in a structure can trigger a change if and only if the 
structure registers the perturbation, so the 
phenomenon of communication depends on not what is transmitted, but on 
what happens to the person who receives it. And this is a very different matter 
from “transmitting information”. (1992, p.196) 
Remembering that the observer can only make an observation from a perspective 
external to the organism, changes in the balance of the organism with its environment 
(its ‘structural coupling’) can be observed, but this is not the same as explaining its 
behaviour, verbal or non-verbal. Communication as a form of behaviour is thus 
inherently social and functional, and at best can only function because it is the result of 
the process of construal by each individual correlating the perturbations of the 
environment with their own experience, rather than an attempt at reflecting identical 
representations of reality. 
 
One psychologically-based premise that has recently come in for a lot of criticism is the 
argument for the “poverty of stimulus” which maintains that the brain must be hard-
wired for language structures because there is inadequate environmental input to result 
in the variety of structures produced by learners. Pullum and Scholz (2002; Scholz and 
Pullum 2006) review the premises of the argument of the poverty of stimulus and 
demonstrate that the empirical evidence provided is inadequate, inaccurate or incorrect. 
The ‘poverty of stimulus’ arguments are central to the claim that descriptions of the 
physical brain are inadequate to explain the linguistic mind. As Tomasello (2004) points 
out, without arguments such as the poverty of stimulus, the Universal Grammar project 
(the largest most well-supported research project in linguistics) fails to stand up to 
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scrutiny and as a result there is a lack of agreement on how Universal Grammar could 
be falsified.  
 
Computer simulations by Luc Steels (1997, 2000) demonstrate convincingly that 
language emerges within an environment, as organisms are required to interact in order 
to survive. We therefore no longer need a “Language Acquisition Device”, or any kind 
of ‘hard-wiring’ in the brain, short of that necessary for learning in general, as 
phenomenological approaches to artificial intelligence and learning have demonstrated 
that it is possible for language to develop without any preconditions such as a Universal 
Grammar. 
 
We may ask why these developments in biology and computer science are significant 
for a dialogue between psychology and SFL. SFL is essentially neither Realist nor 
Idealist, but phenomenological in its approach. Through the concepts of ideational 
construal, interpersonal enaction, and textual interaction (Halliday and Matthiessen, 
1999; 2004), SFL takes neither a representationst approach to the mind nor an 
isolationist approach to culture. Developments in neurobiology and computer science – 
fields that have traditionally depended on psychology for empirical support – could 
influence psychology so that it is able to adopt a more phenomenological approach, 
allowing SFL to integrate psychological arguments and methods more readily than 
previously. If SFL can ally itself with developments that share a broadly sympathetic 
philosophical approach (i.e. phenomenological), it can start to improve those areas of 
theory (including psychological implications or sociological models) that have depended 
in the past on ‘external’ sources. 
3 THE NEED FOR CHANGE IN SFL 
While the preceding discussion may appear to be dismissive of psychology in general, it 
would seem unwise to suggest that language is not in some part psychological. 
However, the preceding discussion demands a psychology based in phenomenology. 
One must consider, then, the characteristics of such a psychology, and one must 
attempt to identify those areas of psychology that may be currently incorporated into 
SFL. One place to look is probably in the area of methodology. This will be 
investigated later in this section. Other developments in and around SFL also advance 
changes in the way SFL can legitimise its claims. 
 
The main criticism that needs to be countered by psychological approaches to SFL is 
that SFL is not psychologically adequate. Butler’s (2008) response is to draw inspiration 
from psychological studies, Dik’s Functional Grammar, and van Valin’s Role and 
Reference Grammar in order to find support for SFL concepts and theories. However, 
as I have tried to demonstrate in this paper, that approach could result in adopting 
findings that are based on a philosophical stance potentially incompatible with SFL.  
 
In response to the criticism of inadequate attention being paid by SFL to psychological 
matters, it could be argued that in fact SFL has already started incorporating many 
concepts that will help it feature both psychological and neurological descriptions, 
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starting with Halliday’s (1995) discussion of Edelman’s work. Halliday and Matthiessen 
(1999) set out a clear and detailed description of a constructivist, phenomenological 
grammar of the ideational metafunction in English. Thibault (1999; 2004a; 2004b) has 
also developed various arguments, partly based on Lemke’s ecosocial theory (1993, 
2000), that demonstrate how a neurologically-based theory of social semiotics can be 
used to describe language development.  
 
Similarly, linguistic theories that impinge on SFL appear to be converging to develop a 
more convincing position for a psychological perspective in SFL. Lamb’s theory of 
neural ‘pathways’ (1999) lends support to a non-representational theory of language 
that can be modelled in neurological processes. Maturana and Varela’s (1980; Maturana 
and Varela 1992) biology of cognition has had a significant effect on computational 
cognition and artificial intelligence which is likely to feed back into related disciplines, 
and an autopoietic linguistics is in development (Kravchenko, 2002; 2006; 2007). 
Finally, with SFL theorists involved in primate language research (Benson and Greaves, 
2005), there seems to be no time like the present for integrating SFL and psychology.  
 
If the philosophical distances between psychology and SFL were not enough, 
methodological factors have ensured a cool relationship. When psychological 
experiments use language, (and throughout we are discussing in very general terms even 
though it may be possible to identify a small number of studies that buck these trends), 
they traditionally fail to take into account the many aspects of discourse that SFL have 
shown to be factors in creating meaning. Four representative, rather than exhaustive, 
examples are given below. 
 
1. Psychology typically models language from a representational viewpoint; 
language is only seen as representing a separate external reality – language is 
the mind’s ‘metalanguage’ for ideas that already exist. This is a perspective that 
does not align with the SFL view that language construes reality, and that 
ideational meaning is only one function of language (Halliday and 
Matthiessen, 1999; 2004; Thibault, 1999).  
2. From an SFL point of view, psychology generally fails to take discourse into 
account. Even when it claims to be accounting for context and co-text2 (a 
distinction many fail to understand), it generally offers invented mini-texts 
with no other language features apart from those under study. This patently 
does not match the role of language in context, which simultaneously operates 
through the Textual, Interpersonal and Ideational metafunctions.  
3. Psychology has traditionally served formal theories of language, often based 
on a predicate logic and depending on (unspoken and unchallenged) theories 
of language acquisition (cf. Halliday’s (1975, 1993) language-based theory of 
learning) and linguistic transformations. This has not helped to develop a 
positive relationship between psychology and SFL.  
                                                           
2 Co-text refers to the surrounding language, while context refers to the broad context of 
culture, as well as the context of situation including all of the physical and non-verbal 
elements of the concurrent situation (Halliday and Hasan, 1985). 
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4. SFL has anthropological and sociological roots. It is a theory of social 
semiosis; of meaning-making in society (Halliday, 1978). Mainstream 
psychology is not. There are undoubtedly fears that introducing psychology 
into SFL, especially in its mainstream individual-centred rather than social-
centred form, would dilute this important perspective. That fear must remain, 
while attempting to show psychological validity for SFL theory. 
 
Assuming, then, that SFL can expect to find more studies in psychology that reflect a 
phenomenological view of the mind and language, it seems that SFL should establish a 
range of guidelines that would help to produce studies compatible with SFL theory. For 
instance, it would be most unfortunate for a phenomenological psychology to continue 
assuming that a sentence can represent language use in all conditions. A major 
requirement of a phenomenological psychology would be to regard a text within a 
specified contextual configuration (Halliday and Hasan, 1985) as the basic unit of 
language; the Genre and Register of a text are vital to its function and meaning.  
 
An SFL approach to psychology should derive theory from SFL theories, from theories 
of the mind, body and brain that correlate with neurological findings, and with a 
phenomenological perspective which recognises the central role of the observer, rather 
than from formal approaches to language and representationist approaches to 
psychology. 
 
SFL can benefit from the methods of psychology, while maintaining the important 
characteristics that distinguish it form other schools of linguistics. SFL will be 
strengthened with falsifiable, verifiable experiments into discourse processing by human 
subjects that support SFL theory. While corpus and discourse analysis repeatedly 
demonstrate the viability of SFL models of analysis, it is difficult for these studies to 
claim that this is how humans derive meaning from text. Psychology methodology can 
thus be employed by SFL to enhance its claims, as long as experiments are based on 
SFL theories of language and are not expected to build SFL theory. This will allow 
quantitative psychological measures to be used alongside the increasing range of 
quantitative measures of text analysis used in SFL studies, as well as a wide range of 
qualitative measures. 
 
The remainder of this paper outlines a project which attempts to combine the linguistic 
insights of SFL with a methodology derived from psychology. The implications for a 
theory of information structure in SFL, and for the interpretation of the data derived 
from the experiment, are also examined. 
4 CASE STUDY: INVESTIGATING INFORMATION STRUCTURE IN WRITTEN ENGLISH 
Various studies have attempted to apply the SFL concept of information structure to 
written English. Information structure separates the stream of language into meaningful 
chunks, with New information, realised by the change in intonation contour, as the 
intended focus of the information unit. The difficulty lies in the fact that information 
structure was originally devised to describe the meaningfully-structured contribution of 
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intonation to speech (Halliday, 1967), but intonation is not realised in written English. 
Davies (e.g. 1994) describes the different modes as sharing a prosody, which ultimately 
relies on the ability to read a text aloud to verify the ‘inherent’ information structure. 
Fries (e.g. 1992) coined the term N-Rheme to delineate the final main element in the 
main clause of a complex as the unmarked location of New information in written 
English, roughly the same position labelled by Martin (1992) as New and Matthiessen 
(1995) as Culmination. Across clauses, Themes produce a Method of Development 
(Fries, 1995) and News produce the Point(s) (Martin, 1992) of a text. 
 
While text analyses have often drawn on these concepts, none have been demonstrated 
to have any real psychological validity. It is not clear in what sense we may say that an 
intonation contour is inherent in written text, or that we hear intonation when reading, 
or that the final position in a clause or complex is significant. We can demonstrably 
recognise intonation in speech, but it is not easy to find psychological experiments that 
have demonstrated an equivalent device working in human subjects while reading. 
There is no shortage of studies in reading, some which maintain that we need to ‘hear’ 
the sounds to read (Rayner, Pollatsek and Binder, 1998), some which suggest we do not 
(Jared, Levy and Rayner 1999), and some that suggest we both see and hear when 
reading (Lee et al. 1999). None of these studies, to my knowledge, however, have 
investigated the SFL insight that the resource of information structure correlates with 
grammatical structure only in the unmarked case. Neither have the concepts of N-
Rheme (Fries, 1992), Culmination (Matthiessen, 1995) or hyper-New (Martin, 1992) 
been strengthened by psychological investigations into subjects’ perceptions of them.  
 
Bearing in mind, then, the hazards, pitfalls, and methodological traps of most 
psychology experiments, in addition to the philosophical and linguistic requirements 
described above, the following case study attempts to investigate information structure 
in written English using a methodology derived from psychology. We are thus 
attempting to demonstrate the psychological reality of this analytical concept. Initial 
hypotheses centre on the following issues: 
 
• Is information structure realised in written English? 
• If intonation is not realised in written English, how is information structure 
realised?  
• If information structure in written English is realised by sequence, where does 
that leave the role and functions of Theme and, more importantly, Rheme?  
• If information structure and Rheme have the same realisations in written 
English (as predicted by N-Rheme and Culmination), does this make them the 
same?  
• Does the original functional decoupling Halliday performed when separating 
Theme from Information Structure for speech no longer apply to written text, 
because you can no longer combine Theme with New?  
• What is the status of the function of information structure – as in the focusing 
of the reader’s attention on newsworthy items by the writer – in written text 
when the more common view of new vs. old information, as understood by 
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psycholinguists such as Prince (1981) and Clark (and Haviland, 1977), is 
realised in SFL as Martin’s Presenting and Presuming?  
• If information structure is not realised in written text, does that mean that 
written text can function without it? If so, what are the implications for SFL? 
 
The ‘standard’ approach is to equate New information with final position in a clause 
(i.e. Matthiessen’s “Culmination”). One way to validate this view of written information 
structure would be to ask a number of people to read the text aloud and correlate the 
intonation patterns produced by different readers (Davies, 1986). However, I would 
suggest that we approach linguistic meaning differently when reading or listening as a 
result of the different affordances offered by the constraints of the visual and auditory 
systems.  
 
Until spaces were inserted between letters to create words in Latin and western 
European vernaculars, reading in western Europe was never silent (Saenger, 1982, 
1997). Our tendency to read in silence is a consequence of both a particular writing 
technology and widespread literacy. Until relatively recently (i.e. 800 years ago), reading 
was typically a group activity, and meaning could only be accurately derived from a text 
when it was read aloud in order to sound out its information structure. However, with 
the introduction of spaces and punctuation, written text took on its own path of 
development. I would propose that most modern academic texts, for instance, are 
generally not intended to be read aloud, and an attempt to do so would likely lead to 
breathlessness. The highly dense nominal phrases in typically relational processes of 
academic text distinguish them from logically intricate but lexically sparse conversation 
(Halliday, 1989). These developments allow us to perform different functions with 
language in the different modes (Vachek, 1987), but are possible because of the 
different demands placed on the auditory and visual systems. For this reason, I believe 
it inadequate to depend on a reading aloud of written text to demonstrate information 
structure. (Davies, e.g. 1994, typically requests his subjects to read plays, commentaries 
and other transcribed or speech-like texts. This reveals how the systems of reading that 
do not depend on graphological marks for pausing can still function in much the same 
way as prior to the 12th century.) 
 
We therefore need another way to validate the theory. This can be done by taking 
methodology from psychology and applying it to an SFL concept in order to discover if 
information structure actually makes a difference to readers. To do this, I designed an 
experiment which presented readers with both ‘normal’ (original) texts and texts whose 
information structure had been disrupted. I first analysed texts for Theme and for 
Presenting and Presuming reference (which I will call Participant Tracking). I then 
made sequencing changes to the text but did not alter Theme or Participant Tracking. 
In other words, I disturbed the Rheme, attempting to disrupt patterns of Method of 
Development (Fries, 1995) by attempting to obscure ‘the point’ (Martin, 1992) of a 
clause. An example is provided in table 1 which shows the original text on the left and 
the modified version on the right with the changes highlighted in bold. The changes to 
the clauses did not appear to 3 volunteers to result in unnatural text. The texts were 
presented to a variety of readers who were asked to respond. The null hypothesis was 
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that readers would not respond differently to the altered texts when compared to the 
original versions. Evidence against this would provide evidence that readers respond to 
information structure, as described above. 
Table 1 Original text and modified version with changes to information structure highlighted 
Original Adapted 
Security measures must be incorporated 
into computer systems whenever they are 
potential targets for malicious or 
mischievous attacks. This is especially so 
for systems that handle financial 
transactions or confidential, classified 
or other information whose secrecy 
and integrity are critical. In Figure 
7.1, we summarize the evolution of 
security needs in computer 
systems since they first arose with the 
advent of shared data in multi-user 
timesharing systems of the 1960s and 
70s. Today the advent of wide-area, 
open distributed systems has resulted in a 
wide range of security issues 
Security measures must be incorporated 
into computer systems whenever they are 
potential targets for attacks that are 
malicious or mischievous. This is 
especially so for systems that handle 
confidential, classified or other information 
whose secrecy and integrity are critical, or 
financial transactions. In Figure 7.1, 
we summarize the evolution of 
computer system security needs 
since they first arose in the 1960s and 70s 
with the advent of multi-user 
timesharing systems with shared 
data. Today the advent of wide-area, 
open distributed systems has resulted in a 
wide range of security issues. 
 
The experimental design allowed for naïve subjects to respond to the same set of 
questions for 4 texts from the same register, all of which were introducing a section of a 
textbook in engineering. 2 texts were adapted (Texts A & B) and 2 were original (Texts 
C & D). 1 original (Text C) and 1 adapted text (Text D) were the same for all readers. 2 
of the texts (A & B) were either presented in the original form or the adapted form. 
The ordering of texts also varied across readers. Some of the questions were 
‘distractors’ in that they appeared to be more typical comprehension-type questions 
with a ‘correct’ answer, in order to detract the readers from the aim of the experiment. 
The target items required readers to indicate how much they agreed that the text is easy 
to read because it gets its ideas across well (“The text presents its main points clearly”), and 
that it progresses well because ideas easily flow from one to the next (“The text progresses 
easily from one point to the next”). Without their knowledge, volunteer readers, who were 
assigned different conditions based on demographic factors (e.g. age, gender, expertise 
in the field of the texts, reading habits), were also timed on the task.  
 
In many important respects this trial reflected a typical psychology experiment. Control 
and experimental procedures were administered across populations, independent 
variables were accounted for, human responses were quantified, results could be 
statistically analysed and volunteers remained largely naïve of the aim of the 
experiment.  
However, a number of important factors distinguished it. Texts were complete and 
between 300 and 600 words. All original texts were published in a particular register 
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and remained to some extent contextualised, even though they were removed from 
their original context; the texts were not created for the purpose of the experiment and 
so exhibit natural features of all metafunctions of language. Readers were not placed in 
a laboratory setting, as this is a social context of its own which bears little or no relation 
to real reading practices. All of the reading was done online, and the volunteers 
participated under relatively normal reading conditions. The experiment was based on a 
theory of language and was designed to evaluate the psychological validity of linguistic 
theory, rather than using language to validate a psychological theory. The linguistic 
theory is fundamentally a phenomenological theory; it assumes that readers will 
construe meaning, that they will see the text as belonging to a particular social context 
of which they will have different degrees of experience, and they will respond to the 
context that they construe through the text. The experiment assumes that participants 
will construe their own meanings from the text within an appropriate context rather 
than attempting to reconstruct the intended meaning of the author. Thus, the 
experiment differs from many psychological experiments designed on the premise of a 
metaphysical mind separated from a physical brain. 
5 RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
After running a pilot and a full survey online for about two months each, 372 subjects 
had volunteered to take part, and 198 had provided responses for all 4 reading texts. 
From these 198, a small number were removed due to the lack of control over the 
subjects. If a subject finished reading and responding to a text in less than one minute 
or more than ten minutes, the responses were judged unreliable. Although these times 
are ultimately arbitrary, they are based on ‘walk-through’ trials with a small number of 
respondents.  
 
Table 2 illustrates the results subjected to hypothesis-testing statistics. A t-test measures 
hypotheses for sample sizes greater than 30, and so is suitable for this study (Bowerman 
and O’Connell, 2003). Using the t-test we discover that between the original and 
modified versions of text A, there is a small but significant difference in readers’ 
perception of ease of reading; there is some evidence that readers found the original 
version easier to read. Across other measures we do not have sufficient evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis, and must say that it is likely that readers did not notice a 
difference in the progression of ideas, and that their reading speed seems unaffected by 
the changes made to the text.  
 
Comparing the original and modified versions of text B we also find a significant 
difference, but in the contrary direction for both ease of reading and progress of ideas. 
That is, there is strong evidence that readers judged the modified version of text B to 
progress between ideas and to present its main points more effectively than the original, 
and yet there is some evidence that the original took less time to read than the modified 
version.  
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Table 2 T-test scores showing a significant difference at a confidence level of ***99%, **95%, 
*90% or below. 
Comparison for 
of 
ease progress time 
A+(original) & A-(modified) 2.045** 1.284 0.923 
B+(original) & B-(modified) -3.318*** -3.874*** -1.157* 
C+(original) & D-(modified) 6.832*** 6.479*** -2.729*** 
All+(original) & All-(modified) 3.953*** 4.092*** -2.459*** 
 
The comparison between the original version of text C and the modified version of text 
D showed consistently across all conditions that there was a significant difference 
between the scores in favour of text C for both types of reader preference and for 
reading speed. There is very strong evidence that the null hypothesis, (that there is no 
difference between the original and modified version), is false and with the scores all 
pointing towards reader preferences as well as faster reading speed in favour of the 
original version, there seems to be very strong evidence that the modifications made to 
the texts, however slight, made a significant difference. Finally, combining the scores 
for all texts provides very strong evidence to reject all of the null hypotheses. It appears 
that the modifications made to the texts made a difference to readers’ perceptions and 
reading speeds of the texts. 
 
There was, however, one significant factor that consistently revealed itself across the 
different conditions: as subjects became more familiar with the experiment, they 
became more efficient at completing the task; there was a strong ‘rehearsal’ effect. 
Thus, the experiment itself had the greatest influence on the readers. The unnatural 
practice of reading four texts in a row accompanied by identical questions was possibly 
more significant than the variable under study. This demonstrates one major flaw of the 
methodology in psychology experiments. 
 
According to these results, then, we can say that the results offer very strong evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis. That is, there is strong evidence to suggest that when the 
original (nominal) group that is presumed to be the New information in the Rheme of a 
text (when there is more than one) is moved to another rhematic position, the change 
can be perceived by readers in how they judge the text and it can take them longer to 
read the text.  
 
However, although the t-test statistics provide evidence for a significant difference in 
both readers’ perceptions and reading times, more rigorous statistics do not provide 
significant results. A chi-square test, designed to measure the inter-relatedness of the 
different variables (Bowerman and O’Connell, 2003), applied to the same set of results 
does not provide evidence for a significant correlation between the manipulation of the 
Rheme of a clause and readers’ perceptions or reading speed. Here the question of 
interpretation becomes most pertinent. While we may be able to demonstrate a higher-
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than-chance probability of readers being affected by the changes in the text, we have 
not demonstrated a causal link between the text manipulation and both the changes in 
readers’ perceptions and reading time. This supports the view that the text does not 
cause meaning in the reader (as in the traditional ‘transmission of information’ model of 
communication), but the changes in the environment that result from the text trigger 
changes in the reader. It would be unwise, therefore, to suggest that the changes in the 
text cause the changes in the reader, since we cannot observe the structural changes in 
the reader; we can only observe their effects. Artefacts of the process of 
communication, in this case the written text, are only triggers for structural change. 
6 CONCLUSION 
The early discussion in this paper addresses some of the very real differences that need 
to be overcome if SFL is to adopt a more psychological perspective in its approach to 
language. While some commentators have noted the need for this perspective to be 
included, I have outlined some reasons that have resulted in an almost hostile approach 
to psychology in SFL. I have explained that this different approach to language is, 
literally, a philosophical matter, namely phenomenology. My hope is that in the future 
psychology in general will adapt to recent developments in cognitive neuroscience and 
neurobiology, which share a great deal of philosophical assumptions with SFL.  I have 
attempted to demonstrate that SFL can start to adopt psychological methods without 
abandoning its phenomenological and sociological positions, even before mainstream 
psychology has changed. In the process I hope also to have shown that there is 
evidence that readers can recognise the effects of information structure in written 
English, providing some indication that information structure has psychological 
validity. Further investigation would help clarify and validate these findings. 
 
It could be argued that I have exaggerated the case, stereotyped, over-generalised, and 
‘painted with broad brush strokes’, particularly in my characterisation of mainstream 
psychology. My aim here is not to suggest that everybody working in psychology is 
unaware of issues raised in this paper. My aim has been to highlight the differences by 
exaggerating them in order to promote discussion and dialogue. I hope that my attempt 
at demonstrating how SFL and psychology could be harmonised is testament to my 
desire to see such harmony. 
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